

Message Text

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TAGS: PARM, US, UR

SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON SOVIET
DRAFT PROTOCOL

TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NO. 39

1. THESE ARE PRELIMINARY COMMENTS OF DELEGATIONON SOVIET DRAFT
PROTOCOL FORWARDED MOSOW 14364

2. MAIN FEATURES OF SOVIET DRAFT PROTOCOL ARE:

(A) OBSERVER RIGHTS WILL BE AVAILABLE ONLY AT DISCRETION OF HOST
SIDE OF EVENTS IN YIELD RANGE 100 TO 150 KILOTONS (ARTICLE IV PARA
1 SUBPARA (H));

(B) OBSERVER RIGHTS WILL BE OBLIGATORY ONLY FOR EVENTS IN YIELD
RANGE ABOVE 150 KILOTONS.

(C) OBSERVERS WILL USE DATA FROM INSTRUMENTS OF THE HOST PARTY
FOR VERIFICATION (ARTICLE IV PARA 3 SUBPARAS (C) AND (D));

(D) THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS SETTING CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL FOR
VALID MEASUREMENTS FOR YIELD VERIFICATION IN GROUPS;

(E) OBSERVERS WILL CONFIRM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY HOST PARTY BY
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USING DATA PROVIDED BY HOST PARTY (ARTICLE IV PARA 3 SUBPARA

(E));

(F) THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS AS TO YIELD LIMITATIONS, LIMITATION TO EXCAVATION, OR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES SPECIFICALLY ASSOCIATED WITH EVENTS TO BE CONDUCTED UNDER SOVIET DRAFT TREATY ARTICLE II ITEM 3.

3. SOVIET DRAFT INCLUDES MORE RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION OF "EMPLACEMENT HOLE" THAN THAT IN US PROTOCOL I.

4. SOVIET ARTICLE II IS CONCERNED ONLY WITH INFORMATION NEEDED TO AID TELESEISMIC YIELD DETERMINATIONS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ITEMS LISTED IN MOSCOW 14436 PARA 9 THAT CONTENT IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE PORTIONS OF US PROTOCOL I ARTICLE III THAT ARE ALSO CONCERNED WITH INFORMATION EXCHANGE TO AID TELESEISMIC YIELD DETERMINATIONS. THERE HAS BEEN SOME REARRANGEMENT OF ITEMS MOST NOTABLY SUBPARAS (E) AND (F) OF US ARTICLE III PARA 1. IN THE SOVIET DRAFT THESE ITEMS WOULD NOT BE GIVEN FOR ALL EVENTS. CONTENT OF US SUBPARA (F) WOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY FOR EVENTS GREATER THAN 50 KT; AND CONTENT OF US SUBPARA (E) WOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY FOR EVENTS GREATER THAN 75 KT. IN THIS REARRANGEMENT SOVIETS HAVE PARTIALLY REVERTED TO THE GRADUATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREED TO IN EXPERT GROUP I IN ROUND III.

5. THE SOVIETS HAVE OMITTED THE CONTENT OF US ARTICLE III PARA 3 SUBPARAS (B), (C) AND (D) FROM THEIR CORRESPONDING ARTICLE II (AND FROM ENTIRE PROTOCOL).

6. SOVIET ARTICLE III OF PROTOCOL DEALS WITH TIME WHEN INFORMATION IS TO BE PROVIDED. THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED THAT THEY CANNOT PROVIDE CERTAIN INFORMATION 90 DAYS BEFORE START OF CONSTRUCTION OF EMPLACEMENT HOLES AND THAT SUCH INFORMATION SHOULD BE SUPPLIED NOT LATER THAN N DAYS BEFORE THE EXPLOSION. TIMING AND HIGHLY PRECISE LOCATIONS WOULD PRESENT A PROBLEM TO US ALSO. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION CALLED FOR IN US ARTICLE III PARA 1 SUBPARA (C) AND (E) SHOULD BE AVAILABLE WELL BEFORE START OF CONSTRUCTION OF ANY EMPLACEMENT HOLE. THE QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION IN ARTICLE III PARA 3 SUBPARA (A) ON THE GEOPHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE ROCK IN THE SPHERE AROUND THE EMPLACEMENT POINT MAY IN SOME CASES DEPEND ON THE PRESENCE OF THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE

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AND THUS NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE THE DRILLING OF EMPLACEMENT HOLE IS COMPLETED.

7. SOVIET DRAFT DELETES PROVISIONS FOR:

(A) TOPOGRAPHIC MAP OF AREA;

(B) AERIAL STEREO-PHOTOGRAPH OF AREA;

(C) PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY OBSERVERS.

8. SOVIET DRAFT WOULD PUT OBSERVERS ON A PROGRAM AND SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES ON WHICH THE PARTIES "SHALL COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING" (ARTICLE IV PARA 5).

9. SOVIET DRAFT WOULD RELIEVE THE HOST PARTY OF INDEMNIFICATION RESPONSIBILITIES (ARTICLE VII PARA 2).

10. ALL OF US PROTOCOL II HAS BEEN REPLACED BY SOVIET ARTICLE IV PARA 3 SUBPARAS (C) AND (D).

11. DELEGATION COMMENT ON NUMBER OF EXCEPTIONS PER YEAR INCLUDED IN SOVIET DRAFT TREATY TEXT ASSUMING THAT SOVIET INTENTION IS TO LIMIT THESE EXCEPTIONS TO EXCAVATIONS EXPLOSION SUMMARIZED IN PARAS 12 AND 13.

12. WORKING FROM CRUDE CROSS-SECTION OF PECHORA-KOLVA CANAL ROUTE GIVEN IN SOVIET REPORTS, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT TOTAL NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS GREATER THAN 150 KT REQUIRED WOULD RANGE FROM A FEW TO 10 OR 20 DEPENDING ON THE ASSUMPTIONS USED WITH MAXIMUM SINGLE YIELD REQUIRED RANGING UP TO SEVERAL HUNDRED KILOTONS. THESE NUMBERS ARE VERY SENSITIVE TO THE TOPOGRAPHIC CROSS-SECTION USED. A TOTAL OF THREE EXCEPTIONS PER YEAR WOULD APPEAR TO BE MINIMAL BUT ADEQUATE UNDER SOME VARIANTS FOR CARRYING OUT PECHORA-KOLVA PROJECT. THREE EXCEPTIONS PER YEAR WOULD ALSO BE ADEQUATE FOR SUCH PROJECTS AS WATER STORAGE RESERVOIRS OR LAND-SLIDE DAMS ALTHOUGH DESIRED YIELDS MAY BE LARGER THAN THOSE REQUIRED FOR PECHORA-KOLVA CANAL. ONE OVERBURDEN REMOVAL PROJECT DESCRIBED BY SOVIETS WOULD REQUIRE NUMBER OF MEGATON EXPLOSIVES ARRANGED IN PARALLEL ROWS. SUCH ARRANGEMENT WOULD APPEAR TO BE IMPOSSIBLE WITHIN LIMITATION OF THREE EXPLOSIONS GREATER THAN 150 KT PER YEAR.

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13. IN GENERAL, THE SOVIET REQUIREMENT OF THREE EXCEPTIONS PER YEAR APPEARS TO BE MINIMUM NUMBER THAT COULD BE JUSTIFIED AS REQUIRED FOR ANY EXCAVATION PROJECT ON A TECHNICAL BASIS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING CANALS. ON OTHER HAND IT WOULD ALSO APPEAR THAT THE ECONOMIC PENALTY OF FOREGOING SUCH A SMALL NUMBER OF EXCEPTIONS WOULD NOT BE VERY GREAT IN RELATIONS TO THE TOTAL COST OF SUCH PROJECTS.

14. PASS TO ACDA. PLEASE SEND TWENTY COPIES BOOKLET "ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS" TO J.M. JOYCE, POLITICAL SECTION, AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW.
STOESSEL

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